Amsterdam Alexandria Marine

19/05/2026

We are pleased to announce that Amsterdam Alexandria Marine B.V. will participate in Navalia International Shipbuilding Exhibition 2026!

📍 Stand: 3B15
📅 Date: 19–21 May 2026
📌 Location: Vigo, Spain

We look forward to meeting our partners, clients, and friends from the marine industry and discussing new business opportunities, marine solutions, and future cooperation.

Feel free to visit our stand and meet the AAM team! ⚓

05/05/2026

Available in stock
CUMMINS KTA19 - 525 HP

22/04/2026

Available in Stock
Twin Disc MGX-6848SC

06/02/2026

20/12/2025

300 machines in stock , Gear boxes power from 200 hp up to 2500 hp , marine engines power up to 2200 hp and marine and I dust generators up to 2000 kva from stock.build your Hull and we can manage ur engine room within 72 hours

07/12/2025

The chart you shared shows new shipbuilding orders (CGT) Jan–May 2023:
• China – 11.2m CGT (62.8%)
• South Korea – 4.7m CGT (26.5%)
• Japan – 1.2m CGT (7%)
• Others – 3.7%

Below is a concise 2010–today overview of worldwide newbuilding orders and how we got to that 2023 picture.

⸻

1. Data & definitions (so we’re on the same page)
• Newbuilding orders = contracts signed for new ships, usually measured in
compensated gross tonnage (CGT), which weights ships by type and complexity.
• Most detailed annual figures come from Clarksons Research, ISL “Shipping Statistics and Market Review”, UNCTAD, and national shipbuilding agencies. A complete year-by-year CGT table is proprietary, but there is enough public information to describe the trend and relative market shares.

Since about 2010, three Asian countries – China, South Korea, Japan – consistently take ~85–95% of global newbuilding orders.

⸻

2. 2010–2013: From Korean leadership to Chinese take-over

Starting point (around 2010)
• Before the financial crisis, South Korea was clearly number 1 in orders and high-value tonnage (LNG, large tankers, offshore).
• Around 2009–2010, China’s new orders already overtook Korea in some metrics: in 2009 China won about 44% of world newbuilding orders vs ~40% for Korea.
• In 2010, China’s new orders were about 38% of the global market vs 37% for South Korea, indicating parity between them.

2011–2013
• The market was still digesting the huge pre-2008 orderbook. New orders were weak and volatile.
• South Korea briefly regained #1 in 2011 as Chinese orders dropped sharply, but the overall level of contracting was low.
• By 2012–2013, China’s capacity expansion and state support pushed it back to the top in orderbook and completions, while Korea and Japan started shutting inefficient yards or merging yards to survive.

Big picture: 2010–2013 is the transition from a Korean-led duopoly (Korea–Japan) to a China–Korea duopoly, with Japan slipping to #3.

⸻

3. 2014–2016: Market slump and restructuring
• Global shipping demand slowed, especially in bulkers and offshore.
• Newbuilding orders fell dramatically, reaching the lowest level in about 20 years in 2016.
• Many European yards exited commercial shipbuilding or focused only on cruise/offshore. Japan and Korea carried out major restructurings (mergers of Hyundai/Samsung/Daewoo yards, government support packages).
• Even in this slump, China kept its share high thanks to domestic/state-linked orders placed at Chinese yards.

Result: Total CGT ordered was very small, but China’s structural dominance became clearer, while Korea and Japan focused more on high-value segments (gas carriers, large container ships).

⸻

4. 2017–2019: Gradual recovery, Asian concentration
• From 2017 onward new orders started to recover, led by:
• LNG & LPG carriers
• Large container ships
• Some recovery in tankers and bulkers
• By 2018–2019, around 87% of global orders were again concentrated in China, Korea and Japan, restoring the “three-Asian-giants” structure.
• A 2019 market review notes that much of the capacity ordered was state-owned cargo interests ordering at domestic yards in China, Korea and Japan – essentially industrial policy supporting their own shipyards.

At this point, the rough pattern was:
• China – largest volume producer, strong in bulkers, tankers, containers, and increasingly in gas carriers.
• South Korea – smaller in volume but dominant in high-tech LNG/LPG and complex ships.
• Japan – steady but declining share, more focused on standard bulkers and some gas carriers.

⸻

5. 2020–2021: COVID shock then huge rebound

2020
• The pandemic caused a collapse in new orders early in the year; shipowners delayed decisions.
• Global newbuilding orders in 2020 were very low; by mid-2021 the comparison base was only 8.24m CGT for the first half of 2020.

2021
• With container freight rates booming and expectations of green fleet renewal, orders surged:
• 24.02m CGT in new orders in H1 2021, nearly three times the same period in 2020.
• Clarksons reported the global orderbook inching back up to around 90m CGT by late 2021.

China and Korea took most of this rebound, with China already near half of world production and orders.

⸻

6. 2022: Lower volume, very high value – gas & “green” ships
• Total new order volume in 2022 fell compared with 2021, but the value of orders hit about US$124.3bn, because of:
• expensive LNG carriers
• alternative-fuel vessels (LNG, methanol, etc.)
• Clarksons’ 2022 review shows:
• China – 49% of global new orders
• South Korea – 38%
• Japan – orders down ~50% vs 2021

The pattern is already very similar to your 2023 donut: China and Korea dominate, Japan is a distant third, and Europe builds mainly cruise/ferries.

⸻

7. 2023: The picture in your chart

Public summaries of Clarksons data for full-year 2023 show:
• 41.7m CGT of new shipbuilding orders worldwide (worth about US$115bn).
• China’s share of shipyard output hits 50% for the first time; South Korea ~26%, Japan ~14% in output.

For Jan–May 2023, the article behind your chart gives:
• China – 11.2m CGT, 62.8% of new orders
• South Korea – 4.7m CGT, 26.5%
• Japan – 1.2m CGT, 7%
• Others – 3.7%

This is basically China + Korea = almost 90% of new orders by CGT, with Japan and others sharing the remaining 10–12%.

⸻

8. 2024–2025: Record order intake, China above 50%
• A 2024/early-2025 review notes that 2024 saw the largest global order intake for 17 years, pushing the world orderbook up to about 364.5m dwt (15% of the fleet).
• UNCTAD’s 2024 Review of Maritime Transport confirms that in 2023 China, Japan and South Korea together produced about 95% of global shipbuilding output, with China alone delivering over 50% of tonnage.
• A U.S. trade investigation and CSIS report both estimate that China’s share of the global commercial shipbuilding market exceeds 50% by 2023, rising further in 2024.
• Reuters reports that Chinese shipyards secured 73% of global ship orders by tonnage in the first eight months of 2024, then around 53% in the first eight months of 2025, still in line with 2023’s dominance.
• A 2025 industry review (VDMA) similarly shows Chinese yards taking about 56% of CGT orders in Q1–Q3 2025, with South Korea second and Japan third.

So the 2023 donut is not a one-off; it’s part of a sustained structural dominance by China.

⸻

9. Structural conclusions (2010–today)

1. Power shift to China
• In 2010 China and South Korea were roughly level in new orders (~38–37% each).
• By early 2020s, China regularly takes ~50–60% of global newbuilding orders by CGT, and more in some years.
• This has been driven by:
• massive state support and consolidation (CSSC etc.)
• large domestic cargo owners ordering at home
• growing capability in high-tech ships (LNG, PCTC, large container ships).

2. South Korea: smaller volume, high value
• Korea’s share fell from clear #1 pre-2008 to ~25–35% of orders in recent years, but it remains very strong in high-value segments:
• LNG and LPG carriers
• large gas-fuelled containerships
• offshore/wind-related tonnage.

3. Japan: mature, shrinking share
• Japan remains a relevant but smaller player, with single-digit global new order share in many recent years and a focus on:
• standard bulk carriers
• some gas carriers
• energy-efficient designs for Japanese owners.

4. “Others”
• Europe – niche but high-tech: cruise ships, ferries, specialized offshore vessels. Output ~8% of global CGT, very little in global order share.
• Philippines, Vietnam, India, Turkey – build bulkers, tankers, car carriers and lots of repair / conversion, often backed by foreign investors or joint ventures.

5. Technology and regulation drive orders

Key drivers of the post-2020 order booms:
• Decarbonisation (IMO 2030/2050 targets, EEXI, CII) → new, more efficient ships.
• Alternative fuels – LNG, LPG, methanol, ammonia-ready designs.
• Post-COVID container boom and PCTC (car carrier) supercycle in 2021–2024.
• Renewed interest in gas (LNG/LPG) and offshore wind support vessels.

⸻

10. How this might relate to your plans

Given your plan for a shipyard in Safaga focused on yachts up to 50 m and workboats up to ~1,000 t, this global picture suggests:
• Competing directly with Chinese/Korean mega-yards in bulkers/large tankers isn’t realistic – and not necessary.
• There is strong, ongoing demand for:
• Retrofits and conversions (EEXI/CII compliance, alternative-fuel readiness).
• Specialized coastal/harbour/support craft tied to port, offshore energy and logistics growth in the Red Sea / Suez corridor.
• High-quality yacht and small-ship repair near major routes (Suez-Red Sea).

01/12/2025

Shipbuilding in Holland

29/11/2025

IMO

Egypt is attending the international maritime organization
What that mean
What is the IMO means to the marine sector
Is that good thing
What egfect will have in the onwer of ships
Ports
And shipbuilders
Shipping companies
What is the positive and negative

Short answer: Yes, it’s a good thing for Egypt – and it will absolutely affect shipowners, ports, shipyards, and shipping companies, mostly in positive ways, but with some extra costs and stricter rules.

⸻

1. What is the IMO?

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a United Nations agency in London that makes the global rules for shipping – for example about:
• Safety of ships and life at sea
• Pollution / environment (MARPOL, ballast water, emissions, etc.) 
• Security (ISPS Code)
• Legal issues (liability, compensation, etc.)
• Future decarbonization & net-zero rules (green fuels, carbon pricing, etc.) 

Their slogan is basically: “Safe, secure and efficient shipping on clean oceans.” 

⸻

2. What does it mean that Egypt is attending / has a seat?

Egypt is already an IMO member state, but now it has won a seat on the IMO Council (Category C) again for 2026–2028. That means:
• Egypt is not only “attending” – it is inside the small group that manages IMO between general assemblies. 
• Category C is for states with special interests in maritime transport (Suez Canal, big ports, etc.). 

So Egypt now has more political weight in deciding future rules on safety, environment, and trade that all ships must follow.

⸻

3. Is that a good thing?

Overall: Yes, very good for Egypt and for serious players in the marine sector.

Why good?
• Egypt gets a strong voice when new regulations are written (safety, fuels, emissions, digitalization). 
• Better chance to protect national interests – Suez Canal, Egyptian ports, shipyards, and fleet. 
• Signals to the world: “Egypt is a serious maritime nation” → can attract more investment, more calls at ports, more shipyard work.

There are also challenges (more obligations, more inspections, more cost for compliance). Let’s break it down by stakeholder.

⸻

4. Impact on different players

4.1 Shipowners (Egyptian and foreign)

Positive:
• Clear, global rules → less chaos, same safety and pollution standards everywhere. 
• If Egypt is active in IMO, it can push for gradual and realistic timelines for new rules (e.g. emissions), which helps owners plan investments. 
• Better reputation for ships under the Egyptian flag if Egypt is seen as a serious regulator → potentially better charter opportunities and insurance perception.

Negative / challenges:
• Higher compliance costs:
• Fuel efficiency / CO₂ rules → upgrades, new fuels, maybe carbon fees in future. 
• Stricter surveys, safety systems, crew training. 
• Older tonnage may become uneconomic if new efficiency and emission rules tighten.

Bottom line for owners:
Serious, well-managed fleets benefit. Poor-quality, old, non-compliant ships will suffer or leave the market.

⸻

4.2 Ports in Egypt (Alexandria, Damietta, Port Said, Sokhna, Safaga, etc.)

Positive:
• Pressure and support to upgrade to IMO-related best practice: VTS, port state control, waste reception, safety & security. 
• Strong Egyptian voice in IMO helps align port regulations with global standards → easier for international lines to call Egyptian ports.
• With Suez Canal importance and strong IMO role, Egypt can market itself as a safe, efficient, “green” corridor for global trade. 

Negative / challenges:
• Need to invest in:
• Port reception facilities (sludge, garbage, sewage, scrubber waste). 
• Digitalization & reporting systems for emissions, port state control.
• Training inspectors and staff.
• Ports that don’t keep up may be seen as less attractive for modern, green fleets.

⸻

4.3 Shipbuilders & ship repair yards (this is very relevant for your Safaga plans)

Positive:
• New IMO rules → demand for new designs (low-emission, energy-efficient, alternative fuels). Yards that understand IMO and IACS class rules will get more work. 
• Existing fleet needs retrofits:
• Ballast water treatment systems
• Fuel efficiency upgrades, hull modifications, energy-saving devices
• Emission control / exhaust modifications
→ More repair and conversion business.
• Egypt being in the IMO Council gives visibility: international owners may feel more confident sending ships to Egyptian yards that are aligned with IMO standards.

Negative / challenges:
• Yards must upgrade their own technical capability:
• Knowledge of latest IMO codes and class rules
• Design capability for green tech, new fuels, safety integration
• Investment in quality management and certification may be needed to compete with European/Turkish/Asian yards.

For you personally (shipyard / marine engineering)

If your yard can say:

“We build and repair to IMO & IACS standards and follow latest environmental and safety rules,”

then Egypt’s stronger role in IMO is a commercial advantage for you, not a problem.

⸻

4.4 Shipping companies & logistics

(Here I mean companies organizing transport, not necessarily owning the vessels.)

Positive:
• More predictable regulatory framework → easier to plan long-term services. 
• If Egypt pushes for smoother, harmonized rules, it can reduce bureaucratic differences between ports and regions.
• Green transition rules can become a marketing advantage: “We use IMO-compliant, low-emission ships via Egypt.”

Negative / challenges:
• Higher freight rates likely, because shipowners pass on:
• Fuel costs
• Emission/carbon costs (if IMO global measure is adopted)
• Compliance and retrofit costs 
• More documentation and reporting requirements (emissions, fuel data, etc.).

⸻

5. Positives vs negatives – quick list

Main positives:
• Egypt gets stronger voice in global shipping rules. 
• Improved image and trust in Egypt as a maritime nation (Suez Canal + ports + shipyards). 
• Clear, unified rules help serious shipowners and builders compete on quality, not on cutting corners. 
• More opportunity for green investment (ports, shipyards, fleet upgrades) and possible access to international support funds linked to IMO climate policies. 

Main negatives / pressures:
• Costs go up for:
• Compliance (safety, environment)
• Fleet upgrades / newbuilds
• Port and yard modernization
• Older, non-compliant ships may be pushed out of the market.
• Companies that ignore IMO direction on decarbonization will be under pressure from regulators, banks, and cargo owners.

⸻

6. Simple summary in plain words
• IMO = the place where the world decides the rules of the sea.
• Egypt getting a strong seat = Egypt can help write those rules, not just follow them.
• For shipowners, ports, shipbuilders, and shipping companies:
• Good if you are serious, professional, and planning long term.
• Painful if your business depends on cheap, unsafe, or dirty shortcuts.

If you want, next step I can:
• Map which key IMO conventions matter most for you (SOLAS, MARPOL, Ballast Water, etc.),
• And how to position your planned shipyard in Safaga as “IMO-ready” to attract international work.

15/11/2025